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Two basic approaches to the question of im-
ported inflation can be found in the recent liter-
ature. The first, which might be called cost-
push, views the rise in import prices as raising
the cost of imports and, hence, domestic prices.1
The second approach, which might be called
world-monetarist, regards the world price level
as determined by the world demand and supply
ofmoney. To the extent that national economies
are closely integrated through trade, capital
flows, and fixed exchange rates, world inflation
will spread to all such economies and result in
general price increases." Both approaches reach
a common conclusion: a national central bank
cannot do much to stabilize the domestic level,
in the absence of a freely floating exchange rate
of the national currency.
This paper calls attention to the special as-
sumptions upon which the validity of that policy
conclusion depends. In general, when the as-
sumptions are relaxed, the central bank is no
longer viewed as totally helpless in coping with
imported inflation. Instead, under certain spe-
cified circumstances, it could be quite effective
in stabilizing domestic prices in the face of price
increases abroad.
By equating cost increases with price in-
creases, the cost-push approach focuses exclu-
sively on the supply side of the market, and thus
ignores any (domestic or foreign) adjustments
on the demand side. In failing to distinguish be-
tween individual price increases and general-
price-level increases, this approach also ignores
the aggregate-budget constraint on market de-
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mand. Rising import prices lead to a general
price increase only if permitted by central-bank
policy, which influences aggregate demand
through its control over the domestic money sup-
ply. Cost-push thus implicitly assumes an ac-
commodating monetary policy, which validates
any tendency for domestic prices to rise as a
result of import-price increases. Since the cost-
push approach does not present a complete
theory, dealing as it does with only one side of
the market, we shall ignore it in the rest of this
paper and consider only the monetarist ap-
proach.
The world-monetarists argue that in an open
economy the national central bank has no con-
trol over the domestic money supply, so long as
exchange rates are not freely flexible. The con-
clusion follows from the assumption of homo-
geneous products throughout the world, so that
the domestic price level in an "open economy"
cannot diverge very far from the world price
level. 3 The homogeneous-products assumption,
thus, defines away the very problem this paper
is focused upon.
At issue is not the theoretical validity of the
monetarist approach, which we do not dispute,
but rather its general applicability. Despite the
rapid integration of the world economy in the
last thirtyyears, inflation rates have varied wide-
ly from country to country even during an era of
relatively stable exchange rates. The following
table shows the dispersion of consumer-price
changes in two selected periods for 41 major in-
dustrial and developing nations:Average annual rates of change (% )
All Countries" 1950-63 1963-72
1. Weighted mean ....3.85 5.08
2. Coefficient of
variation 1.29 1.04
3. Range of variation .-0.6 to 38.1 1.2 to 35.2
Industrial Countries (14)
1. Weighted mean ....2.79 3.96
2. Coefficient of
variation 0.55 0.20
3. Range of variation .1.8 to 5.4 3.1 to 6.0
Developing Countries (27)
1. Weighted mean ....9.41 10.74
2. Coefficient of
variation 1.47 1.43
3. Range of variation.-0.6 to 38.1 1.2 to 35.2
Source: Based on data in International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, various issues.
The data indicate a high degree of variation
of inflation rates among the 41 countries in both
periods, 1950-63 and 1963-72. However, this
variation was much smaller among the industrial
countries than among the developing countries.
Moreover, between the first and second periods,
national inflation rates converged markedly
among the industrial countries, but not among
the developing nations. It appears that, at least
for developing countries, international economic
integration is far from perfect, and international
product differentiation is the norm rather than
the exception.
These observations point to the need for a
further elaboration of the world-monetarist ap-
proach so as to account for this wide dispersion
of national inflation rates. We should explicitly
take into account both product differentiation
and its implications for domestic monetary
policy.
The next section presents a simple monetarist
model that attempts to incorporatesome of these
considerations. It shows that the national cen-
tral bank is not necessarily helpless in coping
with imported inflation, and that the effective-
ness of domestic monetary policy for price sta-
bilization depends critically on the degree of
openness of the economy-measured by the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign products on the one hand and by the
ratio of imports to GNP on the other. 5 Secondly,
it decomposes the impact of imported inflation
on domestic price level into a "monetary effect"
and a "resource effect," and shows that mere
sterilization of reserve increases in order to off-
set the "monetary effect" would be insufficient
for domestic-price stabilization, as it ignores the
"resource effect" of imported inflation.
Finally, by generalizing the world-monetarist
model to the case of differentiated products, the
analysis provides an explanation of the interna-
tional dispersion of national inflation rates in a
way not accounted for in the version of the
model which assumes homogeneous products.
The final section presents a series of empirical
tests of the model, utilizing data for eight Pacific
Basin countries for the period 1948-73. The
model provides a satisfactory explanation of the
domestic inflation in most of those countries,
with imported inflation playing a significant role
in nearly all eight. The results lend support to
the view that the developing nations have a
greater monetary independence for combating




I. Two-Sector Monetarist Model of Imported Inflation
A) The model and analysis (1) M = ky*P
The model consists of nine equations, six (2) P == (dly*)Pct + (m/y*)EPm
definitional and three behavioral. Readers who (3) M == R + C
are interested only in the policy implications, (4) R
h f I I · k' h' b == Ro + Pctx - EPmm not t e orma ana ySIS, may s Ip t IS su -sec-
tion and go to the next. The symbols used are (5)













Imported in the absence of d(Hne~;tic
credit expansion
dP + - dP
m
)
where ( - mI + ) /
and (17) re - m' + ) /y\.
Equation (1 shows that the "terms-of-
trade effect" of imported inflation on the domes-
tic level be into a "mone-
tary effect" and a "resource effect"
The former indicates the in central-bank
foreign reserves as a ratio of the initial domestic
money supply from a in the
terms of trade. The result is positive in the nor-
mal case where the elasticities of export demand
and import demand are sufficiently large such
that the trade balance improves with a fall in the
terms of trade.7 The latter equation measures
the net proportionate change in the nation's real
domestic expenditure, measured in equiv'ahmt
units of domestic product, resulting from
changes in exports and induced by a
change in the terms of trade.s Thus, a trade sur-
plus resulting from a rise in would
be inflationary, because of the induced domestic
monetary expansion coupled with a resultant
drain of resources from the economy.
Equations (14) and (15) can be solved
jointly to obtain dP and as functions of
dPmonly:
By setting dC 0, eqtlatlons
can be solved to obtain:
where x' and m' are the derivatives of x and m
with respect to and the 0 indicates
the initial value.
(7) T_
(8) y == y* + x - mIT
(9) y* == d + miT
Equation (1) states that in equilibrium the
money supply is equal to the nominal amount of
money demand, the latter being proportional to
the nominal amount of domestic expenditure.
Itis a variant of the familiar quantity equation
where V is the income velocity of
money, and Q the national output. Equation
( 1) setsk=1/Vand changes Q to real domestic
expenditure.6 Equation (2) defines the index of
domestic-expenditure prices as a weighted aver-
age of the domestic-product and foreign-product
prices, the weights being the proportions of
domestic expenditure spent on the respective
products. (3) abstracts from the
fractional-reserve system and defines the money
supply as the sum of the foreign reserves and
domestic credits in the central bank's portfolio.
Equation (4) states that the foreign reserves at
the end of the period equal the amount at the
beginning of the period plus the trade balance
during the period, assuming no net international
capital flows. Equations (5) and (6) assume
both national output and world output to be
given, so that the world's demand for the na-
tion's exports and the nation's demand for im'-
ports are functions only of the terms of trade.
Equation (7) then defines the terms of trade as
the ratio of the price of the domestic product to
that of the foreign product, both stated in terms
of the national currency. Equation (8) defines
national output to be equal to domestic expendi-
ture plus exports minus imports, all stated in
equivalent units of the domestic product.
Equation (9) defines domestic expenditure as
the sum of domestic spending for both domestic
product and foreign product, both in equivalent
units of the domestic product.
To facilitate analysis, setthe units of measure-
ment and initial conditions such that initially
P = Pa = Pm = E = 1, and the trade balance
is zero. Then, by assuming a fixed exchange
rate, and upon differentiating and substituting,
we obtain the following relations:
33Effectiveness of national monetary policy
To what extent can a central bank in an open
economy effectively control the domestic money
supply and thereby maintain domestic price
stability in the face of imported inflation? By
setting dPm=O, equations (10)-(14) can be
solved to obtain:
Equations (18)-(20) indicate that the im-
pact of imported inflation on the domestic prices
depends systematically on the extent of the
"monetary effect" and "resource effect" on the
one hand, and the size of the import ratio (i.e.
imports divided by domestic expenditure) on
the other. Theformer effects are directly related
to the elasticities of substitution between for-
eign and domestic products such that when these
products are highly homogeneous-i.e. when
the elasticities of substitution between the two
products in the import-demand and export-de-
mand functions are both very large-dP and
dPd will both approach dPm' The same result is
obtained in the world-monetarist approach un-
der the assumption of perfectly homogeneous
products worldwide.
The import ratio (m/y*)0' or its complement
(d/y*), also enters into Equations (18) and
(19). Other things being equal, the larger the
import ratio, the larger will be the impact of im-
ported inflation on domestic prices.
Equations (18) and (19) enable us to distin-
guish between the determination of the national-
output price (say, the GNP deflator) and the
determination of the national-expenditure price
(say, the consumer-price index). This distinc-
tion is significant to an open economy with do-
mestic products that are not perfectly homo-
geneous with foreign products.
:; ME + re + (d/y*)o'
(18) dPd = (1
(19) dP = [1
(23)
which state that expansions (or contractions) in
central-bank domestic credit will be partially
effective in expanding (or contracting) domestic
money supply-but not fully effective, because
of the resultant reserve loss (or gain) .10
If the central bank has at least partial control
over the domestic money supply, how should
domestic credit be adjusted to check imported
inflation?
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B) Policy implications
The analytical results, stated in equations
(19), (20), (21), and (23) above, may be
summarized as follows:
a) In the absence of domestic credit expan-
sion or contraction, the impact of imported
inflation on domestic prices depends systemati-
cally on the "degree of openness" of the econ-
omy, which in turn is determined by the substi-
tutability between domestic products andforeign
products on the one hand, and the ratio of im-
ports to domestic expenditures on the other.
Operationally, product substitutability is re-
flected in the size of the induced change in the
country's trade balance relative to both its do-
mestic money supply anddomestic expenditures.
The larger the sum of these two ratios, and the
larger the ratio of imports to domestic expen-
ditures, the larger will be the impact of import-
price increases on domestic prices. Only in the
extreme case, where both the induced change
in the trade balance and the import ratio are
very large, will import-price increases be fully
which states that in the normal case where a
trade surplus results from inflation abroad, the
central bank should be able to maintain domes-
tic price stability by contracting domestic credit.
Moreover, the required credit contraction is the
larger, the more closely the domestic product
and the foreign product are substitutes, and the
larger is the ratio of imports to domestic ex-
penditures.
VA) dPm
(lIA) (d/Y*)J dP m,





34reflected in domestic-price increases. kets has been stifled by an official low-interest-
b) The central bank in an open economy can rate policy. Central-bank discount policy is
have at least partial control over the domestic often ineffective at a time when the banking
money supply, again depending upon the "de- sector is already awash with liquidity arising
gree of openness" of the economy as defined from balance-of-payments surpluses. Adjust-
above. However, even in a highly open econ- ments in reserve requirements are sometimes
amy, domestic credit expansion or contraction subject to statutory ceilings. For lack of alterna-
will affect domestic money supply as a result of tives, many central banks have relied largely on
induced changes in the domestic demand for moral suasion to control the growth of domestic
money which are brought about by changes in credit. Altogether, the room for maneuver is
real expenditures and domestic prices. frequently limited.
c) Hence, the central bank could effectively Thirdly, even if a central bank is well en-
use domestic-credit policy for combating im- dowed with flexible policy instruments, a policy
ported inflation. However, the usual prescrip- of systematic sterilization of foreign assets
tion of a simple "sterilization policy"-whereby through domestic-credit contraction is tanta-
central-bankdomestic credits are adjusted mere- mount to a deliberate switch from domestic
ly to offset fluctuations in its foreign assets- assets to foreign assets in thecentral bank's port-
would not be sufficient for achieving domestic folio. Given the amount of national savings, this
price stability. The reason is that this prescrip- implies a substitution of investments in liquid
tion fails to take into account the "resource foreign assets for domestic capital formationY
effect" of imported inflation (i.e. the reduction The desirability of such a policy may be ques-
insupply of goods to the domestic economy). tioned, especially where national savings are
The above analysis deals only with the efficacy very limited and act as a constraint on economic
of central-bank price-stabilization policy in an development.
open economy. Its feasibility and desirability The effectiveness of central-bank policy for
are separate matters. price stabilization thus depends upon circum-
First, the duration of inflation abroad may be stances. Central banks generally should be able
critical in determining a central bank's ability to use domestic-credit policy to maintain domes-
to continue using domestic-credit policy for off- tic price stability a) when inflation abroad is of
setting imported inflation. Such a policy is apt relatively short duration, b) when the economy
to be more viable when the problem of foreign is relatively "dosed" in the sense defined in this
inflation is short-run rather than long-run in paper, and c) when the central bank is able to
nature. employ flexible domestic-credit policy. How-
Second, central-bank policy instruments are ever, both the feasibility and the desirability of
still quite rudimentary in many developing such policy action may be doubtful when none
countries. Open-market operations are often of these conditions is fulfilled. In this situation,
infeasible where central banks hold few market- domestic price stability may not befeasible with-
able domestic assets, especially in countries out adjusting the exchange rate of the national
where the development of domestic money mar- currencyY
II. Empirical Tests for Pacific Basin Countries
How well does the monetarist model we have
described explain the inflationary experiences of
countries with fairly open economies? To an-
swer this question, we analyzed 1948-73 data
for eight Pacific Basin countries with varying
degrees of dependence on trade, levels of devel-
opment, and rates of inflation.1:J Using regres-
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sion procedures, we attempted to answer these
questions:
(1) Is inflation in the Pacific Basin countries a
monetary phenomenon consistent with the quan-
tity equation MV PQ?
(2) Has imported inflation significantly affected
inflation rates in those countries? That is to say,in terms of the (1n<:lnj-,t" eqlIation, have changes
in affected P?
(3) Can central banks control the money sup-
ply and thereby combat imported inflation, if
the exchange rates for their respective currencies
are not floating-i.e., is M controllable
by the monetary authorities?
To test the first we rearranged
terms in the to obtain
P MV/0. Taking logarithms and differ-
entiating with respect to time, we obtain14
(24) P
one would expect changes in the money
supply to have a positive effect on domestic
prices, and changes in real domestic expenditure
(or output) to have a negative effect. Since
changes in the money supply may be offset by
changes in velocity, however, it is also important
to test our assumption of stable velocity.
The first set of regressions reported in Table
1 is based on equation (10), which is a variant
of equation (24), and is of the general form: . .
P = a o + aiM_I + -2+ ... + aJr*(ory)
P = annual change in the CPI index,
= annual percent change in domestic
money supply (currency and demand de-
posits; subscript denotes number of years
lagged),
y* ::= annual percent change in real domestic
expenditure (measured in constant 1963
dollars), .
y = annual percent change in real GNP
(measured in constant 1963 dollars).
With this format, any change in velocity will
be captured by the constant term. In addition,
this specification permits the money supply to
affect prices with lags, whereas ourformal model
posits instantaneous adjustment."
5 Both real
GNP and real domestic expenditure were tried
as explanatory variables, and the best results
are presented in Table 1.
On the whole, this very simple specification
works quite well for all countries except New
Zealand. Except for the latter, the regression
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equation explains between 40 to 80 percent of
the variation in inflation rates; all the variables
have correct signs; the constant term is insignifi-
cant (implying no changes in velocity); and the
Durbin-Watson statistics are reasonably good.
At least one money-supply variable is statisti-
cally significant in every case but New Zealand,
and a lag of t\VO years typically generates the
best results. Not surprisingly, the regression re-
sults with the real-income or real-expenditure
variables do not differ significantly, and in sub-
sequent regressions we only report the results
using real output as the explanatory variable.
To test the imported-inflation hypothesis, we





Pill - annual percent change in the import
price index in the current period (or in
some cases lagged one year).
C annual percent change in central-bank
domestic assets.
Part (b) of Table 1 reports the results when
the money supply is included as an explanatory
variable. The import-price variable is highly
significant and positive for the three developed
countries (Australia, Japan, and New Zealand)
as well as for the Philippines; it is significant
about the lO-percent level for all remaining
countries except Malaysia. Thus, imported in-
flation appears to have been a significant factor
contributing to domestic inflation in nearly all
these countries during the 1948-73 period.
Moreover, the addition of the import-price
term tends to reduce the coefficients of the mon-
ey-supply variables as well as the values of the t
statistic associated with them. This is not sur-
prising, since we would expect rising import
prices normally to increase a country's foreign-
exchange reserves, and thereby lead to an ex-
pansion in its money supply-provided no off-
setting action were undertaken by the monetary
authorities. Thus, changes in import prices andTable 1
(a) Regression Results With Prices Excluded . .
...+O:nY(or y*) P = 0: 0 + 0: 1 M.1 + 0: 2 M.2 +
COUNTRY R2jD.W. D.F.
Australia .23 .43** .41** -.08 .79 19
(.43) (5.44) (5.30) (.68) 1.61
Republic of China 6.18* .09 .22** -.77** .41 17
(l 2.22
Japan -.49 .14** .19** -.05 .45 16
(.26) 16) (2.74) 1.47
Korea 3.51 .07 .32** -2.55 .51 16
(.50) (.47) (.57) 1.84
Malaysia .83 .11* .16** -.15** .54 12
(.12) (1.93) (2.94) (2.94) 2.60
New Zealand 4.16** .06 .05 -.02 0 19
(5.09) (.61) (.50) (.57) .72
Philippines 2.22 .43** .15** -.51** .77 18
(1.44) (5.00) (2.27) (3.67) 2.06
Thailand -.66 .18 .35** -.11 .50 18
(.33) (1.36) (3.38) (.91) 1.83
(b) Regression Results with Import Prices Included
p =0.0 +0:IM.1 +0:}\1.2 + ... + 0: Y+0: P m n m
COUNTRY 0: 0 Y Pm D.F.
Australia -.13 .21** .18** .19** .58** .93 18
(.22) (3.89) (2.98) (2.19) (6.03) 2.52
Republic of 13.9** -.02 .08 -1.11** .10 .55 15
China (3.81) (.21) (.84) (4.66) (1 1.96
Japan 2.44 .13** .14** -.20 .32** .70 18
(1.27) (2.05) (2.05) (1.58) (6.32) .96
Korea 9.87 -.09 .14 -.22 .35 .43 8
(1. 26) (.64) (1.24) (.80) (1.74) 1.57
.79 .08 .11 -.22** .04 .49
(.94) (1 (1.67) (2.73) 2.53
New 2.53** .11 -.03 .08 .40** .44 17
Zealand (2.62) (1.48) (.35) (.62) (3.98) 1.81
Philippines 1.19 .27** .23** -.38** .25** .77 17
(.80) (2.45) (3.53) (2.49) (2.97) 1.52
Thailand -1.16 .16 .39** -.10 .20 .35 15
(.56) (.95) (2.48) (.74) (I.73) 1.85
t statistics in parentheses
** Statistically significant at the 5% level
* Statistically significant at the 10% level
37in the money supply are not truly independent of
each other.
The critical issue for policy purposes is
whether the money supply can be controlled. If
changes in domestic credit ate fully offset by
changes in international reserves, monetary pol-
icy is ineffective in combatingimported inflation.
As a simple test of this proposition, we ran the
following regression for each country:16
where:
R i = percent change in central-bank foreign
• assets of country i.
R = percent change in world international
reserves.
C = percent change in central-bank domes-
tic assets.
B-1 percent change in the exchange rate
(domestic currency units / U.S. dollar)
lagged one year.
The domestic-credit variable had large nega-
tive coefficients which were statistically signifi-
cant for the three developed countries (Austra-
lia, Japan, and New Zealand). For the develop-
ing countries, either the variable was statistically
insignificant (China, Malaysia,Philippines), or
its coefficient wa,S positive (Korea) or negative
but small (Thailand). The world-reserve vari-
able was also highly significant for the developed
countries, but not for the developing countries.
Thus, the results suggest that independentmone-
tary policy under a fixed-exchange-rate regime
may be more difficult for developed countries
than for the developing countries.
17
In conclusion, the following inferences may be
drawn from the regression results:
( 1) A monetarist model helps explain the
magnitude of inflation in the Pacific
Basin region.
(2) During 1948-73, imported inflation ap-
pears to have contributed significantly to
domestic inflation in nearly all Pacific
Table 2
Regression Results For Reserve Changes . ...
R =0: 0 +0: 1 Rw+0:2C; +0:3E~1
COUNTRY C R2/D.W. D.F.
Australia 5.69 .93** -.79** -.15 .87 10
(1.27) (2.74) (5.91) (.63) 1.64
Republic of China 32.4** .24 -.25 -.32 0 17
(2.68) (.25) (.95) (.57) 1.95
Japan 13.35** 3.64** -.89** 6.82** .82 16
(2.13) (7.15) (5.39) (3.77) 2.40
Korea 38.5* -2.18 1.09** -.43* .29 19
(1.81) (1.46) (3.17) (1.91) 2.13
Malaysia 2.91 .21 .07 -2.9** .30 10
(.88) (1.18) (1.57) (2.3) 2.20
New Zealand 4.32 2.43** .64* 1.08** .46 20
(.52) (3.48) (1.83) (2.17) 2.40
Philippines -94.90 8.50 1.69 -.93 0 20
(1.03) (1.29) (.40) (.35) 1.97
Thailand 11.74** -.12 -.12* -4.26 .24 13
(4.18) (.57) (2.06) (1.07) 1.37
t statistics in parentheses
** Statistically significant at the 5% level
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
38Basin countries examined.
(3) Imported inflation appears to have af-
fected domestic prices more strongly in
the developed countries than in the de-
veloping countries in the region. Since
the latter countries tend to have larger
import ratios than the former, this find-
ing illustrates the danger of relying on
the import ratio as the sale measure of
the degree of "openness" of a national
economy.
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Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey,
and Venezuela (developing countries).
5. Intuitively, the product-differentiation concept should be
extended to cover differentiation between domestic and
foreign financial assets. That, however, has not been ac-
complished in this model, which for simplicity abstracts
from international capital flows. The implicit assumption is
that, for the majority of countries today, the substitutability
between foreign and domestic financial assets is so small
that the domestic capital market may be considered vir-
tually insulated from foreign capital markets. Nevertheless,
the abstraction from international capital flows remains a
major shortcoming of the model for application to other
CIrcumstances.
6. Note that the traditional monetary theory assumes the
demand for real balances to be a function of real income or
wealth, not real expenditures. In equation (1), we empha-
size the motive for holding domestic money as for antici-
39
(4) Independent monetary policy also ap-
pears to beless feasible for the developed
countries than for the developing coun-
tries in the sample. This finding helps
explain the wider dispersion of inflation
rates among the developing countries
than among the developed countries, to
the extent that the developing countries
are less well integrated into the world
economy.
pated or potential expenditures at home, including those
on both domestic and imported products, but excluding
foreigners' purchases of the country's exports. The shift
in emphasis will have implications on the type of price
indices dealt with in the model, as to be shown below.
7. The "monetary effect" becomes negative, i.e., a reserve
drain instead of a reserve gain, when the initial volume of
imports is sufficiently large such that the enhanced import
cost resulting from higher import prices exceeds the sum
of the induced increase in exports and reduction in im-
ports. An illustration of the case is the large trade deficits
sustained by many countries as a result of the 1973 in-
creases in oil-import prices. In such instances, since the
"monetary effect" and the "resource effect" must always
be in the same direction, the import price increases are
deflationary, rather than inflationary to the economy.
8. Note that although the measurement of changes in real
income is beset with the index-number problems, the "re-
source effect" as defined in this paper-being a ratio of
the trade balance to the initial domestic expenditure----cis
devoid of such problems. It is, thus, a concept as fully
operational as that of the "monetary effect." The outflow
of real resources induced by inflation abroad corresponds
to the "seigniorage effect" in Mundell's model. See Mundell
(1971).
9. Formal relationships between the "monetary effect" and
"resource effect" and the elasticities of substitution may be
derived. as follows: From aggregate-utility functions of a
constant-elasticity-of-substitution type (CES function), both
the export demand and import demand can be expressed
as functions of the terms of trade. Their partial derivatives
with respect to the terms of trade are positively related to
the elasticities of substitution.
10. Equation (21) suggests that domestic credit expansion
will have a positive effect on domestic money supply, re-
gardless of the degree of openness of the economy. The
result is at variance with that obtained from world-mone-
tarist models, which hold that the national central bank
cannot control the domestic money supply in an open
economy, since domestic credit expansion will be exactly
offset by foreign-reserve losses. The difference arises from
the fact that (i) we assume product differentiation, whereas
the world-monetarist models assume homogeneous prod-
ucts; and (ii) the demand for real balances is a function
of real domestic expenditure in our model, but a function
of real national income in the world-monetarist models.
The result is that a domestic-credit expansion in our model
brings forth a rise in the nominal demand for money
through an import surplus (i.e. dy"'/dC>O) and a rise in
the domestic-expenditure prices (dP/dC>O), both of which
will induce the public to hold a larger amount of theImports/GNP
Country (1972)
Australia 0.15









y*: real domestic expenditure ex-
pressed in units of domestic
product.
P: index of domestic-expenditure
prices.
d: real national expenditure on the
domestic product.
m: volume of imports.
x: volume ofexports.
Po: price ofdomestic product.
R: foreign reserves in the central
bank's portfolio.
T: the nation's terms oftrade, i.e., the
ratio ofits export price to its import
both in terms ofthe national
currency.
Exogenous variables:
y: real national output in units of
domestic product.
centralbank's foreign-reserve hold-
ing at the beginningofthe period.
c: domestic credits extended by the
central bank.
E: exchange rate of the national cur-
rency per unit offoreign currency.
Pm: price offoreign product.
Parameter
k: positive constant
(1oJtne~;uc money. In contrast, by assuming homogeneous
prC)OUCLS, the world-monetarist models rule out any induced
the domestic-price level; by relating demand
for real balances to real income, rather than real expendi-
ture, they also preclude any effects changes in trade bal-
ance might have on the demand for real balances.
11. Shaw, Edward, "International Money and International
Inflation: 1958-1973," Bank of San Fran-
cisco, Business Review, issue.
12. It can be shown, by letting E to vary so as to set dR to
zero, that a nation can be completely insulated from infla-
tion abroad under freely floating exchange rates.
13. The eight countries included in the sample, along with












Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Fi-
nancial Statistics, March 1975; Asian Development Bank,
Key Indicators of Developing Members Countries of ADB,
October 1974; and International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, World Bank Atlas, 1974.
14. Harberger, Arnold C., "Some Notes on Inflation," in
Inflation and Growth in Latin America, Werner Baer and
Isaac Kerstenetsky, eds. (Yale University Press, 1964).
Vogel, Robert c., "The Dynamics of inflation in Latin
America, 1950-1969," American Economic Review, 64
(March 1974).
Meiselman, David, "Worldwide Inflation: A Monetarist
View," Ameriean Enterprise Institute paper, 1974.
In each case the authors were interested in explaining
inflation in Latin America and assumed that the domestic
money supply was subject to the control of the national
monetary authorities.
15. Current changes in the money supply are not included
as an explanatory variable, since the data on prices are
annual averages, whereas the money-supply data are for
end-of-years. Inclusion of the current period's money supply
would be equivalent to having changes in prices lead
changes in money supply by six months on average.
16. Johnson's specification actually compares growth in
domestic credit in the individual country to that in the rest
of the world, and includes a comparable real income
variable. We found the latter variable to be insignificant in
most cases, however.
17. The results, however, are suggestive but not conclusive,
since an equally plausible explanation might be that the
developed countries pursued a deliberate sterilization policy,
whereas the developing countries did not. See, for instance,
the articIe by Joseph Bisignano in this issue.
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